Forensic Corner; Criminalization of the Juvenile
Court
Lee H. Haller, M.D.
The juvenile court began by operating with the model
of "parens patriae." The principle of English law mandated
that the state must care for those incapable of caring
for themselves. Therefore, trials led to findings of
"involved" or "not-involved," rather than "guilty" or
"innocent." If found "involved," then the goal of disposition
(sentencing) was habilitation, not punishment. Because
this was to occur under the watchful eye of a beneficent
judge, no rights were accorded the juvenile.
Unfortunately, the model did not always work ideally.
Litigation ensued which culminated at the U.S. Supreme
Court. In a series of decisions, the court gave juveniles
many of the same rights that adult criminal defendants
have, such as the right to cross examine witnesses,
to have an attorney represent them, and to require a
standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" in order for
them to be convicted and therefore come under jurisdiction
of the juvenile court.
Even though the juvenile was given more rights, the
goal of the juvenile court remained the same, i.e. habilitation
of the wayward youth. The past several years have been
a reversal of that trend, with an increased push towards
punishment and waiver of juveniles charged with felonies
into adult court.
In response to this, attorneys for these minors have
begun using tactics typically employed for the defense
of adults. The first example of this comes from Washington
State where a juvenile court judge convicted a juvenile
on a charge of arson. The charge resulted from the minor
throwing a lit match on his sister's bed. The defense
was that of "diminished capacity" meaning the child
was unable to form the specific intent necessary to
be found guilty of such a serious charge, and that he
lacked the capacity to understand that his actions would
cause a fire. A psychologist examined the defendant,
reviewed records about him, and then was to render an
opinion which fulfilled the state criteria for a diminished
capacity defense. In spite of this, the judge convicted
the youth. The appellate court reversed the conviction
and held that the juvenile court judge erred by not
giving sufficient weight to this testimony (22 MPDLR
164, 1998).
This case involved the use of a very specialized defense
technique in order to get testimony before the judge
that ADHD children, in general, and this child in particular,
have defects in their cause and effect reasoning process.
What a far cry this scenario is from the original intent
of the juvenile court.
The second example of the changing emphasis in juvenile
court from habilitation to punishment was a lecture
given by Robert Shepherd at the recent National Conference
on Juvenile Justice. He proffered the opinion that attorneys
need to learn to address the issue of the juvenile's
competency to stand trial (see MHLR 26, 1998). Although
not specifically stated in the article, this implies
(correctly) that unless the attorney raises this issue,
the judge will presume that the minor is competent,
i.e. can comprehend the nature and object of the proceedings
and cooperate with his/her attorney in formulating a
defense. Clearly, such an assumption would be antithetical
to what we know about children's development. However,
if this is a question that is to be considered routinely
by attorneys who are defending children in an adult
court system, then increasingly child psychiatrists
will be called upon to evaluate this issue. Are you
ready?
Dr. Haller is in the private practice of forensic psychiatry
in Potomac, Maryland
AACAP
News/July-August 1998 |
